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Summary
The development of societies is, to a large extent
dependent upon their resource-base, notably water
resources. Access to and control of water, depends
primarily on the available technology and engineering
feats, such as river diversion structures, canals and
dams. As growing human pressure on water
resources brings actual water use closer to potential
ceilings, societies usually respond by adopting
conservation measures and by reallocating water
towards more beneficial uses.
Several frameworks and diagrammatic
representations of great heuristic value have been
proposed to conceptualize the development of river
basins along these lines. They have brought into
sharp focus the crucial phenomenon of basin
closure, making it  much more clearer and
understandable. At the same time, the simplicity of
these representations may not allow one to capture
the deeper heterogeneity of the processes that
underlie the historical relationship between a
particular society and its water resources.
This report first critically reviews various
conceptualizations of river basin development that
can be found in the literature on water resources. It
then shows that distinguishing between several
categories of water sources, instead of considering
them as a whole, provides additional insight into how
water resources are put into use and are controlled.
The report proposes a disaggregated view of
different categories of water (rainwater, stream water,
regulated surface water and underground water),
allowing for a better understanding of how the actual
and potential use of the different sources of water
relate to each other, and of the scope for
improvement.
A typology of societal responses to water
scarcity is then presented. It emphasizes the need
to distinguish between responses devised by the
state at the national level and those of individual
farmers and small groups or communities, although
both responses are partly interdependent. While
emphasis is often placed on state policies,
adjustments made by local actors also often
appear to be very significant. Responses from both
the state and the local actors can be further broken
down into three types (supply augmentation,
conservation and reallocation). It is shown,
however, that these categories are not as
straightforward as they appear to be. Because of
the interconnectedness of users throughout the
hydrological cycle (particularly upstream/
downstream and surface water/groundwater
linkages) they are not purely additive. Whether
these responses occur sequentially, is examined by
referring to several empirical situations which
illustrate that specific historical evolutions and
patterns that do not accord with the reviewed
frameworks can frequently be encountered. A few
elements, which appear to be crucial in shaping
responses are then singled out, including the nature
of the state and state/citizenry relationships, the
impact of “shock events,” the nature of the political
economy, and the conditions of agrarian change.
Existing linear visions of basin development
tend to be based on economic rationality or on
concepts of social adaptiveness that are too
restrictive or too difficult to evaluate. Societal
responses to the scarcity of resources, at both the
local and the state level, are not driven solely by
economic considerations or locally perceived
needs. It is argued that they must be understood
not only on the basis of hydrological, physical or
economic constraints, but within a wider political
economy framework that considers the distribution
of human agency and power among actors, as well
as their respective interests and strategies. The last
section attempts to devise a new framework that is
comprehensive enough to trace the evolution of a
wide variety of river basins and to avoid reducing
them to a single, oversimplified form.vi1




The evolution of societies and, in particular, the
development of their productive activities, are
partly determined by the available natural
resources. Water resources, defined within their
river-basin environments, are mobilized for
domestic use and food production, and are,
therefore, of paramount importance. In early
times, when population density was still low,
people adapted agriculture to abundant land and
water resources. Crops, cropping calendars and
elaborate subsistence techniques were attuned
to natural conditions of soil, topography, climate
and hydrology. Gradually, entire landscapes and
waterscapes were crafted, especially under
conditions in which it was easy for a small group
of individuals to work together to construct a
temporary diversion of river water, or under
conditions in which early states exercised tight
control over large populations to develop large-
scale schemes for flood control or irrigation.
In the face of growing human pressure and
in the course of time, however, the supply of
natural resources reaches its capacity. River
basins, and often land frontiers, “close,” in the
sense that most water resources are committed
or depleted with very few remaining untapped.
Water needs come to exceed water availability in
river basins and people find that their productive
activities are constrained by water shortages.
This prompts crises that, in turn, lead to
technological innovations and to adjustments and
interventions, both in institutions and in the
economy. Societal adaptations to changing
relationships between people and water-basin
resources seem to move through a unilinear
sequence of stages, similar to those that Rostow
(1962) has theorized for economic growth.
This sequential model of the evolution of the
river-basin society has the merit of providing a
generic framework to address an issue of
worldwide relevance. It also has a great heuristic
value, in that it brings into sharp focus the
crucial phenomenon of basin closure, making it
understandable and straightforward. At the same
time, however, its simplicity may not allow us to
capture the contingency and deeper
heterogeneity of the processes that underlie the
historical development of societies. This report
first reviews several approaches to conceptualize
river-basin development. It then shows that
distinguishing between several categories of
water sources provides additional insight into
how water resources are put into use and are
controlled. A typology of responses to water
scarcity and a review of some crucial aspects of
river basin development, are then used to devise
a new framework, that is both comprehensive
enough to describe the evolution of a wide
variety of river basins, and avoids reducing them
to a single, oversimplified model.2
The literature provides a few (and recent)
attempts to theorize the phases of water
resources development. Molden et al. (2001b),
for example, distinguishes between three
phases: development, utilization and allocation
(figure 1).
In the first phase of basin development,
water use is limited to rain-fed agriculture and
run-off-river- water utilization. Dams are
constructed in the most convenient locations,
either to produce energy or to irrigate, while the
supply for domestic purposes remains
quantitatively negligible. Large-scale irrigation
systems, therefore, may be constructed. The
amount of water effectively used for agriculture
and other beneficial uses is less than what is
available, much of which simply flows to the sea
or to the next downstream basin. Water
management tends to be based on demand, and
conflicts, therefore, rarely arise. Water quality
remains good and releasing more water from
reservoirs easily mitigates pollution. Ecological
systems and environmental functions are not
significantly altered.
In the next phase, the utilization phase,
shortages of water begin to appear in the driest
years and during unusually dry seasonal spells.
Storage dams are added to the river as a
safeguard against shortages, but adequate sites
tend to be rare. Improving management,
rehabilitating infrastructures and conserving
water become critical issues, while pollution
problems and competition within irrigated areas
become apparent.
As the basin nears closure, sectoral
allocation becomes a point of tension (allocation
phase). Efforts are directed at allocating water
towards the most economically valuable uses,
and new institutions evolve to address inter-
sectoral competition and manage river-basin
resources in an integrated manner.
The account by Molden et al. (2001b)
identifies consecutive responses to water
scarcity, starting with water-resources
development, followed by improvements in
efficiency and sectoral management, and
culminating with modernization and inter-sectoral
reallocation. The linear logic of this model is
Common Views on River-Basin Development
FIGURE 1.
Schematic representation of river basin development.
Source: Molden et al. 2001b.3
depicted in a table that compares the problems
faced by, and the prominent issues associated
with, each of the three different phases towards
a final situation, where water use is reserved for
activities with a high economic value,
groundwater and pollution are regulated, and
basin-level coordination and integrated
management are used to mitigate conflicts.
The description of Molden et al. draws on
earlier works of Keller et al. (1998) and Keller
(2000), which also break down river-basin
development sequences into three phases, each
one being subdivided into two further subphases
(figure 2). In the first phase (exploitation),
demand is initially satisfied by the simple
diversion of river water and by pumping water
from shallow aquifers. As pressure for water
increases and these tactics become inadequate,
people evolve a second subphase of exploitation,
marked by the construction of large-scale
storage capacity and by a capacity to pump
water from deep aquifers (“a straightforward
engineering solution”). When the available water
resources in a basin approach full development,
the conservation phase begins. In the early
stage, demand reduction and an increase in
efficiency are the usual means to bring usage
into conformity with the availability of resources.
Return flows are reused, but savings in quantity
generally result in problems of water quality
(pollution and salinity) that need to be addressed
in a later phase (water treatment, reclamation
and salt disposal). Despite these efforts, it is not
unusual to see imbalances between the
abstracted water and the annual renewable
supply, especially with the overexploitation of
aquifers. The third phase, or the augmentation
phase, starts when the basin is fully closed and
additional supply must be brought from outside
the basin, typically from neighboring basins with




Source: Keller et al. 1998.4
This framework is also based implicitly on a
linear vision of the development of water use
towards a “mature” situation, where uses are
attuned to the renewable supply, while water
quality is maintained and environmental-flow
requirements are ensured. The evolution is
depicted as a “natural progression of water
development in a river basin.” The two
sequences are similar, but they differ in some
details.
1 In particular, the latter sequence
specifies a phase of augmentation after demand
management has been effectively implemented
and it sees groundwater use as a characteristic
of the earliest stage, unlike the former.
These stages are broadly consistent with a
vision of development, described in economic
terms, as shown in figure 3 (Hayami et al. 1976;
Kikuchi et al. 2002). Development starts with the
expansion of rain-fed agricultural land. A point is
reached (point t1) where the marginal cost of
opening up new lands exceeds the marginal cost
of developing irrigation. In the construction
phase, the cost of surface irrigation systems
rises as irrigation expands into increasingly
marginal areas. However, the development of
new technologies, specifically adapted to
irrigated agriculture (green-revolution
technologies), shifts the marginal cost
2 curve
downward from I to I
1. Eventually, a point t2 is
reached where the cost of new irrigation exceeds
the cost of investment in effective utilization.
Depending on the situation, more effective
utilization and better performance can be
achieved in a number of ways, such as through
better control and management of surface-water
flows, recycling water by pumping from drainage
ditches, and by developing groundwater
resources (curve W), (Barker and Molle 2003).
FIGURE 3.
Hypothetical development paths of agriculture by means of land and water development.
1The former is presumably derived from a situation observed in developing countries, while the latter is clearly influenced by the experience
of the USA (more particularly that of California).
2This, of course, reflects the situation of the producer and does not account for the costs of developing such technologies.5
This economic view focuses on technology
and on the costs of development and water
management. It neglects the transaction and
political costs of institutional reforms. Another
limitation of this economic view is that it does
not account for the fact that upland expansion
may restart at a certain point, because possible
irrigated areas are already saturated. New lands
are then put into use and a new phase of
agricultural expansion in marginal upland areas
begins, as seen, for example, in Vietnam (de
Koninck 1997).
These generic descriptions of basin
development are based on the evidence that
water resources gradually come under growing
pressure, and that society devises strategies to
cope with the new situation, thus relieving the
tension, albeit temporarily. Another conceptual
framework for water-resources development has
been developed by Turton and Ohlsson
3 (1999).
They also distinguish between three phases, in
which water scarcity is answered by different
strategies. During the first phase (supply), “the
individuals surrender their responsibility for
providing water for themselves to a central
authority,” which embraces a hydraulic mission
devoted to large-scale hydraulic infrastructure.
Later, water deficits arise and demand
management (demand phase) first consists of
raising the efficiency of use, and then of
operating intra- and inter-sectoral reallocation of
water resources. In a third phase (adaptive), the
society has to cope with absolute water scarcity
and must bring water demand in line with a
sustainable level, defined by annual renewable
resources. This description is similar to the
preceding ones,
4 but Turton and Ohlsson’s (ibid.)
analysis goes beyond the quantitative analysis of
imbalances in supply and demand, and
discusses the societal responses induced. They
are interested in the links between the nature
and legitimacy of the “coping strategies,” devised
by decision-making elites and by social stability.
In particular, they see the emergence of water
deficit conditions (demand phase) as a crucial
period, where environmentalism is likely to gain
momentum, and where the adaptive capacity of
the social entities concerned is put on trial.
Turton and Ohlsson (ibid.) distinguish between
a “first-order scarcity” of natural resources (water),
and a “second-order scarcity” of the social
resources, required to adapt to the former. They
have reformulated their framework as the “turning
of the water screw,” where engineering
development, improvements in end-use efficiency,
and allocative reforms, are seen as the three
successive responses that are needed to address
a persistent water scarcity. Although they claim to
go beyond the kind of linear vision described
above, this reformulation does not really provide a
conceptual alternative, although it adds a more
intuitive visualization of the fact that every turn of
the water screw is “tighter.” The social resources
needed, therefore, to achieve this reformulation are
increasingly high.
In addition, Turton and Ohlsson (ibid.) are
also concerned with distinguishing between
situations in which social resources enable
society to adapt, and others, where conflicts and
social unrest are likely to be the outcome. In
particular, they do not necessarily posit that
crises generated by water scarcity will be
3Their framework is not specifically focused on river basins but, rather, on water resources at the national level, because of the importance
given, in their discussion, to state policies. However, water scarcity is discerned at the basin level and it is, therefore, consistent to apply their
concepts at that level.
4Although the demand management phase includes both conservation and allocation strategies, the adaptive phase is construed as an addi-
tional phase, where social stability is at risk and major societal adjustments are needed.6
The first limitation to the development models
reviewed above, is that they consider aggregate
“annual supply” or “available resources” without
distinguishing between the different sources of
water. This section proposes a disaggregation
and categorization of different “sources of water”
that may help better understand how a society
manages and uses its water resources. The four
categories described here can also be viewed as
water sources that can be ranked based on the
degree of control that the society has on them.
Water-Source Categories
At the basin level, water availability is
determined primarily by rainfall.
6 Rainwater is
intercepted and evaporates, or is captured
directly by cultivated fields, either because it
directly infiltrates the soil or because it does so
after being retained in the fields by furrows,
bunds or small dikes. Part of the water that fills
the soil reservoir is eventually consumed by
crops (effective rainfall), while the remaining
water infiltrates lower layers of the soil, partly
recharging the streams. The total effective
rainfall depends, of course, not only on the
cropping area but also on the terrain (soil type,
slope, etc.), and on how crops are cultivated
(cropping techniques, mulching, etc.).
Stream water is unregulated water from the river
system, generated by direct surface or
subsurface runoff. It may be diverted (by gravity)
or abstracted (by pumping) for production or
other needs. Human intervention is necessary to
divert, convey and apply stream water. Stream
water occurs independently of reservoir operation
although, in many cases, its flow adds to that
released from dams.
Controlled water is water that has been stored in
surface reservoirs (dams, lakes, etc.),
discounting the average loss by spill, evaporation
and infiltration, or underground reservoirs
(aquifers), and that can be used at will and
purposely, once released or extracted. Even for a
given set of reservoirs, the amount of controlled
water is not necessarily constant and may
change over time (e.g., change in dam inflow,
siltation of reservoirs, etc.). Likewise, the safe
yield of the aquifer may change slightly if the
recharge is altered in consequence of changes
in the hydrological regime (for example, if water-
harvesting infrastructures are constructed).
Average values are considered here, which
5While the other frameworks do not explicitly state that the evolution of river basins must be seen as a positive move towards a more desir-
able state, it seems that the ideology of progress is so pervasive that river basin development is often implicitly interpreted as such. This was
illustrated, anecdotally, during a seminar in which different river basins were tentatively placed on the time axis of a chart. A Nepalese col-
league, uncomfortable with seeing a Nepalese basin occupying the leftmost position, expressed his disagreement with the classification,
before being explained that many people wish their basin were still at that stage…
6Aquifers may extend beyond the limits of the watershed and trans-basin diversions may also occur, which may alter the typical situation
described herein. Desalinization of seawater can also be considered as an inflow of freshwater, not pertaining to the basin itself.
eventually solved,
5 especially with regard to
ecological impacts, thus rightly shifting the
attention to the adaptive capacity or social
capital of societies.
Disaggregating Basin Trajectories7
somehow obscure the interannual variability that
is paramount to the management of regulated
resources.
Potential controlled water is the average total
amount of water generated in a basin that can
be stored in reservoirs that are technically and
economically feasible, societally acceptable, and
environmentally suitable, plus the safe yield of
the aquifer. This limit is partly relative and
susceptible to change. For example, uneconomic
options at one point in time (e.g., trans-basin
diversion), may become acceptable when the
value of water rises or, on the other hand, when
dam construction may run into too much
opposition from the civil society and may be
ruled out. Actual controlled water may exceed
the potential (renewable) controlled water if
groundwater abstraction exceeds the safe yield
of the aquifer, and/or if dam management leads
to tapping carryover stocks (i.e., if the average
yearly release from the dam temporarily exceeds
the average net inflow).
Distinguishing between such categories is
further complicated by the fact that both the
absolute value of the different categories of
water and their relative share of the total amount
of water used vary over time. If there is a rainy
season, rainwater will generally predominate,
while in the dry season (or in arid regions),
controlled water will be the primary source for
the crops. Though a period of one year allows
one to get an aggregated overview of the
situation, it does not provide any information
about the constraints faced in particular periods
of that year.
General Evolution of Water Use
Figure 4 provides a view of (hypothetical)
evolutionary patterns. It allows us to compare the
amount of water, available between the different
categories of water sources, used by different
activities. It also indicates how the abstraction of
controlled water compares with the potential
values.
The rainfall quadrant (lower-left quadrant)
shows the amount of rainfall that has been
utilized in both irrigated and nonirrigated areas
(which may also include forests), while the
stream-water quadrant (upper-left quadrant)
indicates how much water has been diverted
from streams for use.
The evolution of “surface water” (upper-right
quadrant) exemplifies a (particular) case in which
the potential available water is slightly declining
(e.g., dam siltation or upper catchment
hydrological changes), and in which the basin is
reopened by a trans-basin diversion (indicated
by a last step, t), and also indicates the
incidence of desalinization (slight increase after
step d). The amount of water depleted or
committed to in-stream and downstream needs
(including environmental services) becomes
closer to the potential value. The difference
between these two curves accounts for the share
of dam releases, which is non-beneficial,
7 lost
either to the atmosphere (evaporation) or to
sinks (including the sea).
8 The groundwater
quadrant (lower-right) shows an increase in
withdrawals, which exceeds the aquifer safe
yield before returning to a level under this limit
(an optimistic scenario).
7The case of hydropower makes this distinction less straightforward, in that all the water released does provide the benefit of energy genera-
tion. In a closed basin, however, providing that hydroelectricity is not the main source of energy generation in the country, the downstream
users will generally be granted priority. Their needs will dictate water releases, notably their timing, and hydroelectricity will only be a byproduct
of these releases.
8For some ecologists, such losses do not exist, since the whole natural water regime is constitutive of ecological systems. We have assumed
here that minimal environmental flows can be defined and incorporated as one term of demand.8
Figure 4.
Changes in water use at the basin level.
It must be made clear, at this stage, that the
above figure does not depict a water balance but
that it only compares the contribution of the
different sources of water utilized by human
activities (or needed for environmental services).
In that order, the four quadrants disaggregate
water sources, from the least to the most
controlled, where “control” is taken as a measure
of the reliability of the source in terms of quantity
and timing at the seasonal level. Underground
water is generally safe in the short term and
users can extract a predictable volume.
Regulated surface water is also reliable, but
includes some uncertainty of the coming inflow,
and its distribution over long distances may
result in an uncertain supply. Stream water is
dependent on natural flow (i.e., rainfall and
runoff) and is, therefore, subject to little control.
Finally, rainfall is the most unpredictable source,
in terms of quantity and timing.
The return flow from the use of these four
different categories of water may contribute to
the potential of another category. For example,
the return flow from rainwater may accrue to
the stream, surface water or underground-
water categories. Figure 5 is derived from
figure 4, and shows both water that is
abstracted and that which is effectively
depleted. The ratio of the two values provides
a measure of the efficiency of the use of each
category. For rainwater, the depleted fraction is
the effective rainfall.
9
9There are some difficulties in establishing the amount of rainfall utilized by plants because they may also tap groundwater that entered the
aquifer in other parts of the basin (or even outside of it). In basins with a certain degree of closure, the water table will often be low and the
amount of water taken up by plants will generally originate from the in-situ infiltration of rainfall (or irrigation water).9
FIGURE 5.
Changes in water used and depleted at the basin level.
Breaking down the different types of water
use highlights, not only their respective shares
and the degree of overall control on water
resources, but also the main sources, the
potential of which is not fully realized. In
practice, sometimes it will be difficult to separate,
not only stream water and rainwater (e.g., when
water use is very scattered: numerous small
tanks and run-of-river systems in Sri Lanka), but
also stream water and controlled water (e.g.,
when there are significant surface or sub-surface
side-flows between the dams and the irrigated
areas, which add to dam releases). Yet, this
distinction is essential for the better
understanding of water use: for example, it is
often the case that irrigation mainly uses stream
water that would otherwise be lost. The meaning
and implications of stating that agriculture makes
up, almost, 80 percent of total water use, thus




considers these different categories of water, as
well as their spatiotemporal interrelationships, is
a more complex exercise than figure 4 suggests.
What is clear, however, is that the whole picture
of water accounting is changed significantly if we
consider controlled water in isolation, in order to
estimate potential gains from improved
management, or if we include stream water or
rainwater in the picture (see Molle and Aloysius,
forthcoming, for the case of the Chao Phraya
10See fundamentals of water accounting in Keller et al. 1996; Perry 1999; Molden and Sakthivadivel 1999.10
and Walawe river basins). Therefore, it is useful
to disaggregate the temporal evolutions of the
different segments of water resources, to better
grasp what the evolutions have been and where
we are at present, thus avoiding the limitations
inherent in the representations described in the
first section.
11 Even with this disaggregation,
however, the figure referring to surface water does
not indicate the water shortages that may occur in
specific periods of the year. Likewise, since the
curves are based on moving averages of yearly
values, they also do not account for shortages
induced by the improper inter-seasonal and
interannual regulation of controlled water.
11For example, because surface water and groundwater are considered together, the difference between the actual and the utilized regulated
water may not indicate where the remaining potential lies, or where excess abstraction occurs.
The Demand-Supply Equation and Adaptation to Scarcity
The conceptual frameworks, reviewed above,
hypothesize the nature and the chronology of the
challenges and responses that society faces,
with respect to water resources. The underlying
assumption is that population growth puts
pressure on water resources and that this, in
turn, creates challenges for the society and leads
to a gradual closure of the basin. The focus here is
on basins with significant and growing
anthropogenic pressure, and it is reasonable to
retain both the gradual closure and consequent
adjustments/conflicts as general phenomena. What
is debatable, however (and questioned in this
section), is whether the sequences described in
these frameworks are found in all basins, and
whether the responses are similar, or if a more
inclusive framework can be designed.
It is hypothesized here that societal responses
to water scarcity comprise a set of strategies,
defined both at the individual/community level and
at the state level, and is elaborated or induced,
based on several location-specific factors, without
any other assumption about a possible “natural”
order or sequencing.
Range of Responses
While Turton and Ohlsson (1999) emphasize the
way “technocratic elites” devise “coping
strategies” to respond to water scarcity, they
tend to overlook the multileveled adjustment of
society to basin closure. In particular, they do not
account for local adjustments made by individual
users, or groups of individuals, and by local
managers/officials, in addition to the state. This
constrains the analysis of processes and leads
to envisioning future changes as being governed
by the decisions of the state and its elites.
Broadening the scope for analyzing actors’
responses provides a richer understanding of the
processes at work. The distinction between
micro/local and macro/global adjustments will be
herein, identified.
These two types of adjustments can be
further broken down into three categories.
(These are similar to the three consecutive steps
mentioned by Turton and Ohlsson (ibid.) but, at
this stage, no hypotheses are made on the order
in which they materialize).11
Supply responses: These consist of solving
water scarcity by augmenting the supply from
existing sources (foremost, increasing the
quantity of controlled water), as well as from
tapping additional sources. Typically, this is done
not only by constructing new reservoirs or
digging more tubewells, but also by diverting
water from neighboring basins, by desalinizing
seawater (which is tantamount to importing and
treating water from a sink), by artificial
groundwater recharge or by cloud-seeding.
At the local level, farmers may tap shallow or
deep aquifers, and may also invest in local
storage facilities (most commonly farm ponds,
which are used to store excess irrigation flows or
rainfall). They also develop the conjunctive use
of water, by using water from drains, rivers,
ponds and even by pumping from irrigation
canals when the water level does not allow for
gravity inflow to their plots. Thus, they broaden
their access to a variety of sources and augment
their individual potential supply of water.
It is already apparent here that the
relationship between local dynamics and the
basin (macro level) must be considered. For
example, pumping water from drains increases
supply locally, but not necessarily at the macro
scale, if the pumped water was to be reused
downstream.
Techniques and interventions aimed at
capturing more rainwater, for example, water-
harvesting techniques aimed at increasing
groundwater recharge, can also be considered
as means to augmenting one’s effective supply
of water.
At a more global level, the import of foodstuff
is also an indirect way to increase water supply,
or at least the water supply as a necessary
factor of food production and security. This
transaction is often referred to as virtual water,
because of the water used by the crops that
comes embedded in foodstuff.
Conservation responses: The key phrase here is
“efficiency in use.” Conservation refers to making
a better use of existing resources, without
increasing the supply or the sources of water.
Line agencies may not only implement structural
measures, such as lining canals, controlling
leakage in pipe systems, or treating and allowing
the reuse of wastewater, but may also resort to
nonstructural measures, such as improving dam
or canal management (so that unproductive or
non-beneficial releases are not lost
12 to the sea)
and establishing rotations or other arrangements
for better scheduling. The state is also
instrumental in devising and enforcing policies
that may elicit water savings, such as water
pricing, rationing and quotas. In these two latter
cases, conservation aims at “doing as well as
before with less supply,” rather than “doing more
with the same amount.”
13 The state may also
supply innovations derived from research (plot-
level water management, improved varieties, and
cultivation techniques).
Improved coordination between users and
innovative organizational patterns may also
contribute to water savings and can be
mentioned here, particularly in the setting of
water-user groups or river-basin organizations.
12Again, this does not mean that all water reaching the sea is lost, since minimum flows are essential to maintain ecosystems and control
salinity intrusion in lower reaches of the rivers. These losses must be understood as the extra water that reaches the sea after abstraction by
all other users, including environmental services.
13These two situations are rarely distinguished, although they differ fundamentally. In the latter case, the incentive to conserve water is strong,
and users are prompted to make effective adjustments. In the former case, users may or may not be willing to take the necessary steps to
conserve water.12
Subsumed in the “conservation strategy” are,
more generally, better management practices
that not only tend to conserve water, but may
also increase equity or reliability in the supply of
water.
At the local level, farmers and groups of
farmers are not passive.
14 Water may be saved,
for example, by shifting calendars or raising
bunds around rice fields (to make a better use of
direct rainfall), adopting adequate cultivation
techniques (such as mulching, alternating the
wet/dry water regime in rice farming, shortening
furrows, etc.) or by choosing crop varieties with
a shorter cycle. These farmers or groups of
farmers may also invest in water-saving
technologies, such as micro-irrigation. However,
such technologies may sometimes result in
better control of irrigation doses and, in an
increase in the amount of water depleted by
evapotranspiration (see an example for Chile in
Cai et al. 2001). The water saved thereby may
also be used to increase the farmers’ irrigated
area (see Feuillette 2001, for an example in
Tunisia), further reducing the return flow
available to downstream users. Therefore,
expected water savings at the basin level may or
may not occur and may also have an adverse
impact on other users. Here, too, a case-by-case
cautious analysis must be carried out to fully
understand the relationships between the local
level and the macro level.
Allocation responses: A third type of strategy
consists of reallocating water from one user to
another, either within the same sector (e.g.,
within or between irrigation schemes) or across
sectors. This reallocation may be justified by the
need to raise water productivity, but may also be
aimed at easing tension on the resources by
favoring uses which enhance land productivity,
food security or equity, or which reduce conflicts
and protests. This broadens the principle that
water should be moved to uses that are
economically more beneficial, to which
reallocation is usually attached, towards an
approach whereby reallocation is a means to
reduce the overall pressure on water resources.
Reallocation can occur within the farm, when
a farmer chooses to direct his/her limited water
resources to the crops that give him/her a higher
return per m
3 (assuming that risks and marketing
conditions are similar for all crops).
15 At the
irrigation-system level, managers allocate water,
based on a set of factors. This allocation can be
more or less even in terms of water duty per
hectare, but it can also be driven by other
considerations: for example, areas that are too
distant or that are endowed with sandy soils may
be excluded, because they incur too high losses.
On the other hand, reducing canal head-end/tail-
end differences is conducive to higher equity
and, often, to increased economic efficiency
(Hussain et al. 2003).
At the basin level, managers also have the
option of reallocating water according to a given
priority system. Within the agricultural sector,
water can be shifted from one area to another
with comparative advantages regarding water
productivity (typically, areas with orchards or
aquaculture). The rationale for inter-sectoral
transfers is generally economic: water is
channeled to cities for domestic and industrial
uses before to agriculture, where the economic
return of one cubic meter of water is much
14Contrary to the central argument of demand management through water pricing, farmers facing water scarcity do not need to be taxed to
make sense of it. Experience with reduced supply quickly translates into responses that may, however, be encouraged or constrained by
public policies (e.g., impact of free rural electricity supply in some states of India upon groundwater depletion).
15Again, clear-cut definitions are not always possible. A crop shift can be a conservation measure (less water used), or a reallocation to a
more productive (crop) activity (more $/m
3), or both.13
lower.
16 Such allocation decisions are, of course,
not only potential sources of conflicts and
tension, but are also sometimes mediated by
market mechanisms or negotiations. Groups of
users within an area (e.g., a catchment or an
irrigation scheme) may also agree to renegotiate
rights in order to ease tension. To some extent,
giving up agriculture (or any other water-
consuming activity) can also be interpreted as a
strategy that allows one’s water allotment or right
to be reallocated to other uses.
At a more global level, water can be
reallocated to nonagricultural uses at the cost of
lower food production, if imports are increased
accordingly (see virtual water mentioned earlier).
The conservation and allocation responses
are often pooled together under the concept of
water demand management, which can be
typified by “doing better with what we have,” as
opposed to supply augmentation strategies.
Figure 6 synthesizes these different
responses and shows how the three categories
can be broken down into two sublevels. It must
be emphasized that the definition of these
categories cannot be totally freed from ambiguity
because of the complex relationships between
local and basin-level processes: a farm pond dug
out by a farmer can be seen as conservation if it
captures some canal water that would be further
lost (to sinks, to non-beneficial evaporation or by
flowing out of the system), but it may also be a
reappropriation if this water was ultimately to be
used by downstream users. The pond can also
be considered as an augmentation of the supply
to that particular farmer, if it captures runoff that
was lost earlier. In practice, because it is not
always possible to establish what fraction of a
specific return flow is eventually lost or reused, it
may not be possible to define a precise
terminology.
16Contrary to the widespread idea that economic incentives are necessary to ensure the reallocation of water to economically more produc-
tive uses, inter-sectoral reallocation is often well administered by the state, and it is rather the consequences of this reallocation, in particular
upon agriculture, that need to be addressed.
FIGURE 6.
Types of responses to water scarcity.14
The same difficulty arises when new tanks
are constructed in the catchment area of an
existing reservoir. Normally, isolated tanks
capture runoff and transform it into controlled
water but, in that case, the flow captured by
these new tanks was already potentially
controlled by the reservoir into which it would
have flowed, if the new tanks had not been
added. Overall, there is no or little increase
17 of
controlled water; instead there is a mere spatial
redistribution of the resource. Likewise, trans-
basin diversions, and even cloud-seeding, can
be considered as supply augmentation from a
narrow/local point of view, but they can also be
treated as spatial redistribution (or reallocation)
when seen on a wider scale.
These examples show that the measures
taken at the two levels (individual and collective)
schematized in figure 6, are not purely additive.
This fact, however, should not be treated as
“noise.” The relationship between micro- and
macro-processes is, in fact, at the core of the
analysis. Because the closure of river basins
results in a growing interdependence of the
users within the basin, one must carefully
analyze how the paths of the different surface
and underground flows are interrelated, and how
any local intervention that modifies the quantity,
the quality or the timing of one of these flows,
impacts on the whole system.
18 What is stored,
conserved or depleted at point A, dictates what
is available at point B, further downstream.
Likewise, it is not always possible to
dissociate the decisions taken by farmers from
the economic environment that is shaped by
state policies. The adoption of micro-irrigation,
for example, might be an individual decision,
influenced by the availability of subsidized credit
supplied by the state. (This is symbolized in
figure 6 by the arrows that link the two layers).
The types of responses shown in figure 6
can also be distinguished according to the time
frame of their implementation. Some of them,
particularly those implemented by the state, need
many years to be in place (e.g., dams, trans-
basin diversion, and water laws), while some
responses unfold within a more limited period
(one season, one or two years). This is the case
of short-term responses to water crises (typically,
implementing rotations, changing crops, drilling
wells, etc.). In other words, one may distinguish
between responses to long-term imbalances
between supply and demand, and responses to
short-term ones (punctual water shortages or
crises).
Actions taken by people may not be
motivated by the type of strategy they come
under: conservation responses, for example, may
arise from an interest in increasing farm income
rather than in conserving water.
19 Such actions
may not be “responses” or “strategies” directly
related to water scarcity, but may have a
coincidental effect on the basin hydrology. More
generally, responses also have an effect on
17An increase occurs if the amount of spill in the reservoir—now reduced—was formerly lost out of the system. This is more or less significant
depending on the dimensions of the reservoir in relation to the hydrologic regime (and, of course, depending also on the type of downstream
users and ecosystems present).
18See Keller (2000) with regard to water management in California, and Molden et al. (2001a) who developed the concept of hydronomic
zones, with a call for reason interventions, based on a zoning of river basins. “Hydronomic zones are defined to characterize the combination
of hydrologic and water-use settings within a basin. The zones are based, primarily, on the considerations of the outflow of water from the
particular areas” (Molden et al. 2001a).
19Micro-irrigation provides a good example of such a situation. In many cases (probably a majority of them), it can be shown that the adoption
of such technology is motivated not by water scarcity itself but, rather, by labor shortages, the need to better control the quality of production,
the ease in applying (liquid) fertilizers, or the use of plastic mulch that precludes more rudimentary irrigation (e.g., Jordan).15
factor uses and often change the distribution of
benefits. For example, investments in capital and
labor-intensive water-saving technology have an
impact on local suppliers of equipment, and on
the labor market.
Figure 6 also highlights that actors within the
system are not passive and inactive. On the
contrary, they respond individually and
collectively to the growing scarcity of water, just
as agrarian systems respond to changes in the
relative availability of other production factors.
This has been shown by case studies, such as
those by Zilberman et al. (1992) for California
and by Molle (forthcoming) for Thailand. State-
driven responses are only a part of the
transformation, although officials tend to see
rural areas as globally static, and malleable
through public interventions (infrastructures or
otherwise), overlooking the constant endogenous
adjustment of rural households and communities,
as well as of line managers, to changing
conditions.
Context-Specific Responses
In addition to categorizing the diversity of
societal responses to water scarcity, a
conceptual framework must also provide a
degree of prediction on the range of adjustments
a given society is likely to pick up or, rather, on
the measures that are made possible,
constrained, or that are ruled out, in the context
under consideration.
Keller et al. (1998) place emphasis on the
economic logic of the sequence of development.
At any point in time, the cheapest solutions are
selected, from simple flow diversion through
desalinization. Their sequence follows the cost of
the main options available in large basins of the
western USA. In Ohlsson and Turton’s (1999)
approach, the logic of the succession is based
on a scale of complexity, with the solution of
water-scarcity problems demanding ever-
increasing levels of social resources. It is thus
assumed that hydraulic development is the
easiest response, and that its exhaustion leads
to conservation efforts, later followed by
allocative decisions and adjustments. The latter
two are regarded as much more sensitive and
are prone to generating social conflicts and
widespread disruption. These two analytical grids
probably apply to many cases, but may not
capture important nuances found in varied
situations. The following examples provide
instances in which the “natural” sequencing, or
part of it, as proposed by one of the
abovementioned frameworks, does not
satisfactorily represent the historical
transformations observed.
• Sakthivadivel and Molden (2001) have
compared five basins said to be at
different stages of evolution, and have
found that the problems faced by these
basins were different. However, some of
the problems encountered were not
those that would be typical of the phase
in which each basin was assumed to be.
For example, in the Singkarak-Ombilin
basin in Sumatra, which is considered to
be at the beginning of the utilization/
conservation phase, it seems that water
allocated to nonagricultural activities and
trans-basin diversions threaten to throw the
basin directly into the third phase, where
water rights and reallocation rules need to
be defined. The East Rapti basin in Nepal
is an open basin, with only 5 percent of
the water resources being used by
agriculture. In spite of this, water pollution
from industries, competition for river water
during the dry season among wildlife
sanctuaries, tourist requirements,
ecological requirements and human use
are apparent problems that are normally
associated with the later phases of
development.16
• More generally, most of Africa, with the
exception of northern and South Africa,
is still characterized by limited
development of infrastructures. The
number of large dams in a continent that
makes up 20 percent of the world area
amounts to only 1,192 out of a total of
24,864 dams worldwide (IWMI 2002).
Likewise, the irrigated area makes up
only 6 percent of the total cropping area
of the world. The reasons that seem to
have prevented the emergence of the
development phase are not fully
elucidated.
20 The decline in crop prices in
the recent years compounded this
situation, making both subsidized/public
and private investments in agriculture/
infrastructure, economically unviable.
This means that a conjunction of
endogenous and exogenous factors has
constrained the large-scale development
of water resources, while problems
related to other phases have emerged.
• In some basins, the tapping of shallow
aquifers occurred in the inception phase
of development (Keller et al. 1998), but
in many other cases, the spread of wells
was a late reaction to poor access to
surface water (see Thailand, Bangladesh,
India, etc.). The availability of technology
and the investment capacity of users
must also be considered.
• Very often too, large dams were not
constructed to increase supply, but to
control floods and generate electricity.
Because their potential has been then—
often later—taken advantage of to
develop irrigation areas, demand
consequently built up as a result of the
new supply, rather than demand for
water being a driver of supply
development. This has often been the
case in the river basins of the United
States of America (Wengert 1985).
• Problems of pollution are generally
associated with late phases in which the
scarcity of the resource does not allow
adequate mitigation by dilution, but it
may also happen very early if there are
significant point sources of pollution, with
little regulated water to ensure dilution
(such as with mines in South Africa).
• The need to design more complex and
integrated forms of organization at the
basin level, are associated with an
ultimate phase of “allocation” of very
scarce water resources but, in some
cases, as with the case of France in the
1960s, it was the problem of water
quality, and not quantity, that was the
driving force behind the establishment of
the “Basin Agencies” (despite both
aspects being interlinked).
• Trans-basin diversion is generally
considered as a possible way in which to
“reopen” the basin after it has closed, but
this option is often taken at much earlier
stages of development (at the first
stage), especially in small and medium
basins. This was commonly achieved in
Sri Lanka, at least as early as in the fifth
20Koning (2002) argues that this is partly because Africa’s elite is caught up in personal patronage relations and lack strong farmer move-
ments that could ensure adequate support to agriculture, including trade protections.17
century (Mendis 1993), and has
remained a basic principle of water-
resources development, ever since. Such
transfers are also typical of irrigation in
mountain interfluves, where irrigated
areas straddle the boundary of two
adjacent basins (e.g., in the Andes).
• It seems that, in many cases, the later
phases of basin closure employ, not only
allocation strategies but, more
pragmatically, all the options that may
help relieve pressure. The case of
California, as described by Turral (1998),
clearly shows not only that efficiency and
allocative measures are both
simultaneously sought, but also that the
gains they provide are more limited than
are commonly believed and need to be
accompanied with a substantial amount
of supply augmentation. Closure does
not end up with allocative strategies but,
rather, elicits continuous improvements
on the three “fronts” (conservation,
allocation, and supply).
21
• In contrast to the impression that the
current focus on the economic value of
water is characteristic of a late phase of
water-resources development, the British
period of the Indian history clearly shows
that all the questions currently debated
on the economics of irrigation were
already prominent ones. The questions
of who was to finance infrastructures
(local revenue, the Crown, or private
interests), whether and how a water fee
should be charged and what its impact
on different categories of people is,
whether it should be increased (opinions
diverged among the British Government,
the Government of India, local
government, canal engineers, etc.),
whether it could influence crop choice or
water-use behaviors, to cite a few
examples, were fiercely debated from the
beginning of the nineteenth century
onwards. Privatization, bulk volumetric
pricing and crop-based differential rates
were experimented with.
• Not all trajectories are upward. Historical
examples of civilizations that have not
successfully maintained their resources
base and that have collapsed can also
be easily found. For example, aerial
photographs of some basins in Sri Lanka
reveal a very high density of small tanks
that have been abandoned, silted or
destroyed. After Independence (in 1948),
new water-resources developments have
sometimes been superimposed upon the
older systems, and larger dams have
been built. Other examples include
ancient Mesopotamia in the ninth century
(cf. Pointing 1991) and, more generally,
all the impacts of climatic change,
salinization or tectonic change that are
often overlooked in historical studies
(Brown 2001).
• The “averaged” vision, inherent in the
trajectory concept, may also obscure the
heterogeneity of on-the-ground reality.
Subareas in the basin are often at different
stages of evolution and the problems they
face, as well as their solutions, vary
significantly. Molden et al. (2001a) have
attempted to address this issue by defining
“hydronomic zones” within a basin.
21If we reexamine figure 3 on such grounds, we might draw a different pattern, where the different curves tend to converge, in the long run, to
the same order of magnitude.18
• Spatial heterogeneity is paralleled by
human heterogeneity. When considering
the diversity of farming systems, one
finds at the same time, different
individual responses: water conservation,
intensification, diversification, giving up
agriculture, etc. Factor endowments,
farmers’ agency and market
opportunities, among other things, shape
individual strategies and, therefore, it is
not always possible to describe the
resulting aggregated trend at the basin
level in a simple way.
Critical Elements in Basin
Development
The above examples suggest that specific
historical evolutions and patterns can be easily
encountered. Investigating in detail the causal
correlations between particular physical/societal
contexts and historical transformations of river
basins is, beyond the scope of this report, but
this section attempts to single out a few
elements that appear to be crucial in shaping
responses.
The Nature of the State and State/Citizenry
Relationships: The state is often described as
the main actor that shapes all river-basin
evolution by virtue of its investments and
policies. Turton and Ohlsson (1999) identified the
building up the state’s power with the launch of
the “hydraulic mission.”
22 As mentioned earlier,
this emphasis tends to obscure the magnitude
and significance of endogenous efforts
undertaken by local actors, especially in view of
the development of the conjunctive use of water.
It also fails to account for situations in which
resources are principally managed by the users
themselves, such as in the case of the tank
systems of south India or of the mountainous
regions of the Andes, Nepal or upland southeast
Asia.
The nature of the center/periphery and state/
citizenry relationships defines the scope and the
room for maneuver and adjustment allowed to
the different actors in the system. Authoritarian
or despotic states may be more often
associated with large-scale development and
centralized management (regardless of how the
causality is theorized), while weak states may
leave more scope for local initiatives. The
degree of decentralization and democratization
also obviously influences how negative impacts
(particularly on health or the environment) are
both perceived and addressed.
The role of the state often changes over
time. Ruf’s (2001) description of the Prades
Valley in the south of France shows that, during
its five centuries of existence, the irrigation
system has been managed, in turn, by the state,
communal associations and private
entrepreneurs, and that these changes could be
traced to the prevailing nature of the center/
periphery relationships, defined within the wider
political and historical context. Theories of
induced institutional change tend to see
changes as occurring by necessity, in response
to a mismatch between demand and supply, and
these theories do not account for the (numerous)
cases where the power and political structure
eventually dictates and supplies new institutions
and forms of organizations (see below).
Potkanski and Adams (1998) describe the
response of the Sonjo, in Tanzania, to water
scarcity and show the interrelationship between
agricultural commercialization, property rights
and water scarcity, on the one hand, and the
22It is not always very clear whether Turton and Ohlsson (1999) refer to river basins or countries.19
complex and tightly interactive relations between
local institutions and the state, on the other.
23
Economic power and political will are often
associated together, and small communal
schemes may be captured and enlarged when
new actors, such as local lords or colonial
estates, come into play. Larger-scale
interventions that are beyond the scope of local
actors may be later undertaken by the state or
by some capitalistic private entity.
24 When basins
are developed in stages, defined by successive
historical, economic and political contexts, then
several phases of supply augmentation, followed
by growing water scarcity and resulting
conservation/allocation measures, are likely to
take place. This scenario differs from that of the
above frameworks, which tend to hypothesize
one, single, compact phase of state intervention
and “heroic engineering” that exhausts (or nearly
exhausts) the physical opportunities for such
interventions.
Turton (1999) posits that a popularly
supported legitimate government will be able to
introduce measures that an unpopular
government will not be able to introduce. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that reallocative
strategies are likely to be unpopular, but the link
with the dichotomy of democratic versus
authoritarian regimes, is not developed. In fact, it
is evident that the latter may sometimes
reallocate water with more facility, irrespective of
whether this is done in a sound manner or not.
Last, things get even more complex for
international rivers, where political relations
between states come into play. Scenarios may
differ significantly from those described above.
The Political Economy of Water Resource
Development: Clearly, the economic rationality
described by Keller et al. (1998) has a strong
impact on the choices that are made. However, it
is necessary to go beyond a formal model of
rationality and towards a political and economic
approach, where decisions are understood not
only on the basis of their actual financial costs,
but also on the basis of the benefits and
increased power that accrue to the different
categories of actors within the society, and
sometimes beyond.
25 Costly (and even absurdly
costly) solutions, such as groundwater recharge
by injection or trans-basin diversion, are
sometimes justified and implemented in lieu of
demand-management options, because they fit
the logic of pork-barrel politics and serve as
substitutes of other more politically risky options.
The conflicts between politicians, construction
firms, consultants, local population and
environmentalists, provide the best example of
how the decision of building a dam is eventually
debated in a political arena, where financial or
political interests coexist with environmentalism,
communitarianism and concerns for local
livelihoods.
Another way to look at these societal
debates, is to weigh the monetary costs of
infrastructural development (and their financial
benefits) against the transaction and political
costs of more demand-management-oriented
23This study shows, in particular, that not all endogenous institutional innovations provide benefits for the whole community, and that if the
state may be intrusive, it may also be instrumental in preventing the outright and inequitable appropriation of resources by any group of
individuals.
24Ruf’s (2001) paper also provides such an example in the Ecuadorian Andes.
25Barker and Molle (2003) stress how investments in large-scale infrastructure during the cold war can be partly ascribed to geopolitical con-
siderations. The “lending culture” of development banks has also been criticized as reflecting either the interest of western construction firms
or that of the banks in increasing the scale of their interventions.20
options. The difficulty of reforming management,
including efficiency and equity aspects, varies
depending on many cultural, social and political
factors. But it is recognized that “regional
politicians have a powerful intuition that
economic principles and the allocative measures,
which follow logically from them, must be
avoided at all costs” (Allan 1999). This largely
explains the persistent gap between the
rationality of consultants and experts and the
actual adoption of policy measures in the real
world. It also provides hints on why strict
economic logic is not always the best criteria to
understand the succession of state investments
and responses. Resource capture can occur at
any time, depending on the power balance within
the society, and is perhaps more frequent than
rational allocation. More generally, the responses
given to water shortages depend on which
constituency succeeds in making its discourse
legitimized and accepted (Ingram 1971). The
example of water conservation in the Imperial
Valley Irrigation Scheme, southern California,
given by Waller (1994), neatly shows how local,
influential farming elites associated with irrigation
managers could legitimize policies which shifted
the cost of conservation onto other parties.
Rather than accepting on-farm conservation
systems, which would have raised the amount of
time and effort needed in farming, as well as the
reliance on hired labor, these elites successfully
pushed for temporary measures of land
fallowing, for which they would be compensated.
This leads Wester and Warner (2003) to call
for a vision of water as a politically contested
resource, and the closure of river basins as a
political process, where the overexploitation of
resources is accompanied by the changing
patterns of access to water, and by the
legitimization of certain forms of basin
management through the production of dominant
water discourses.
It is interesting to note that the financial
costs of the three main responses (supply
augmentation, conservation, and allocation
options), are generally in a decreasing order.
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The lesson that can be drawn from this is that
decision makers in most societies have an
inverted perception of what the costs to society
are, or more to the point, of how the political and
financial “benefits” accruing to them and to their
supporters, compare with the political costs and
the risks of societal discontent incurred.
Shock Events: The responses and behavior of
water users and of the society at large, regarding
water use and water-related problems, depend
on their perception of the magnitude and severity
of these problems. This perception, in turn, is
often sharply influenced by extreme natural
events, such as typhoons, droughts and floods,
which are generally accompanied by food
shortage, disasters, and the disruption of
livelihoods. Waves of dam construction are often
launched after severe droughts or famines, such
as in Burkina Faso or northeast Brazil (see Molle
1991). The drought periods of 1987-1991 in
California (Zilberman et al. 1992; Keller 2000), of
1992 in Turkey (GDRS and IWMI 2000), of 1982-
83 in Australia (Turral 1998), of 1986 in Israel
(Allan 1999), and of 1991-94 in Thailand (Molle
et al. 2001), to mention a few examples, have
catalyzed a series of significant local and global
responses. Dams are also designed in response
to floods, as the case of the Tennessee Valley
Authority well exemplifies.
26Except for the case of water treatment. It can be posited that investments in urban water supply and sanitation create the potential for a
“new construction bonanza” (Turral 1998), similar to that of the earlier “hydraulic mission.”21
The most significant example of a crisis,
however, remains the El-Niño-related climatic
perturbation of 1972, which severely affected
grain production and sent prices rocketing up.
The psychological impact of this event, on both
national decision makers and western countries
(engaged in the Cold War and bent on investing
in countries potentially threatened by the spread
of communism), was so high that much of the
huge investments in dams and irrigation
infrastructures that were to follow, can be
ascribed to the threat of food shortage in the
particular geopolitical context of the time (Barker
and Molle 2003).
Shock events often allow politicians to
impose policies that would have been otherwise
unpopular and opposed. Allan (1999) has
remarked that politicians are, therefore, likely to
wait for the exhaustion of resources and the
surge of crises, before embarking on draconian
reforms.
Other shock events, which have a dramatic
impact on agricultural development in general
and water resource use, and development in
particular, are political events, such as wars,
revolutions, agrarian reforms, etc. The
periodization of water-infrastructure development
in Vietnam (Tessier and Fontenelle 2000) or in
China (Lohmar et al. 2002), for example, neatly
dovetails with that of political upheavals and
reforms. Likewise, the collapse of the
Mesopotamian irrigation in the early Middle-Ages
owes much to the impacts of wars and
epidemics (plague), (Christensen 1998).
“Spatial Equity” and Regional Politics: Another
important point, which drives the choice of
supply augmentation as a response, is that the
economic rationality at the basin or country level
has to be combined with a notion of “equity” that
pervades regional politics and, more often than
not, conflicts with economic criteria. The regions
with lower comparative advantages stand to lag
behind other regions, and often display higher
levels of poverty. These “problem” regions,
therefore, turn out to be the target of special
investments, which generally have a low return,
and which are dictated by political and
socioeconomic concerns.
An example in point is that of “overbuilt
basins,” where regulated water resources are
insufficient to serve the existing irrigated areas,
but where more irrigation schemes are built,
based on the claim that the regions not benefited
hitherto, also have a right to receive investments.
This, Ingram (1971) noted, is supported by the
strong local sentiment that water is always
locally thought of as “our” water. Local
sociopolitical dynamics and strategies conflict
with macro considerations and logic, thus
depicting a typical example of a basin-level
issue. When decentralization means that local
regions or provinces have the mandate to design
local strategies without considering their impact
at a wider level, these situations are often very
salient. The Mekong delta offers a good example
of how provincial plans are based on the same
freshwater resource, and how their combined
impact on the whole delta hydrology might have
catastrophic consequences on salinity intrusion
in dry years (Can Tho University and IRD 2001).
In other words, the micro/macro dialectic of
water use within the basin is paralleled by a
similar spatial interconnectedness with regard to
economic planning. The result is often “artificial”
scarcity created by the overcommitment of
resources, fostered by flimsy knowledge or
consideration of hydrology, and promoted by
developmentalism. In Algeria, for example, the
World Bank supported both irrigation projects
and urban water supply networks in
competition for the same scarce resource
(Winpenny 1994).
A particular form of the impact of regional
politics on water resource development is well
exemplified by the case of the U.S.A. The states,
wishing to see their local projects funded by
federal agencies, need to muster support from22
other states in order to obtain congressional
acceptance. This “pork barrel” politics leads to
the spread of projects with very low returns and,
often, with environmental impacts. The case of
the Central Arizona Project (CAP), discussed by
Welsh (1985), shows how Colorado garnered
projects for its vote authorizing the CAP, and
how other states like New Mexico, Utah, and
California could take advantage of the CAP to
claim for their own projects. The CAP itself, most
particularly the projected Orme dam that was
part of it, was an extravagant example of a
project with low returns, critical impact on
wildlife, spoliation of Indian land, which was
pushed by the Bureau of Reclamation, despite
strong opposition and numerous alternatives
(Welsh 1985).
Agrarian Pressure and Agrarian Transition:
Individual and societal responses are also
strongly governed by the alternatives of
livelihoods offered to people, and to, what can be
termed as “agrarian pressure.” If strong
population growth occurs in a context where,
nonagricultural sectors are unable to absorb the
excess rural labor, then the pressure upon land
and water resources is likely to increase. This
translates, not only into greater agricultural
intensification and water conservation, but also
into water-quality degradation and conflicts. If the
water supply to agriculture is squeezed, then the
social consequences on the rural world (and also
the possible political clout of the farming sector)
are likely to trigger state responses (as
exemplified by the subsidizing of western
agriculture). On the other hand, if favorable
alternatives are supplied within the wider
economy, water users with deficient supplies will
be encouraged to diversify their activities or to
simply give up farming, thus easing the tension
on resources.
Agrarian pressure is also, directly linked to
household incomes and, therefore, at least for
those products with a degree of import/export,
linked to the price of commodities in the world
markets. This price, in its turn, depends on a
more complex and global equation that includes
food production, population growth, productivity,
as well as all other variables that impact on, or
distort markets. The Middle East provides a good
example of a region, where water policy is
“subordinate to the political economy of global
trade in staple food” (Allan 1996).
The intensity of societal demand for change,
the individual responses to the deterioration of
access to water, the relative growth of the
different economic sectors and the impact on
water use, are all interrelated with macro-
economic settings.
Demand/Supply-Driven Innovations
Molden et al. (2001b) argue that as basins
develop, new forms of organization and rules are
required, but they take the view that new
“institutions (inevitably) evolve to fulfill
management requirements,” and do not address
the issue of whether, and how these institutions
emerge. The few points mentioned in the above
section already suggest some agents of change.
The more general question of the causation of
institutional and technical changes cannot be
addressed in detail in this report, but it can be
useful to recall here, a few theoretical postures,
and to sketch out the driving forces at work.
Social Adaptive Capacity: The evidence that
some societies seem to avert crises (as well as
to “reconstruct” resources after their degradation)
through the mobilization of appropriate
innovations and new institutions, while others do
not, has led some social scientists to investigate
which factors could be singled out to explain this
situation. Ohlsson (1999) has recently developed
the idea that some societies were endowed with
“adaptive capacity,” which should be considered
as a resource, and that the lack of this resource23
could be termed “second-order scarcity,” in
addition to the physical first-order (water)
scarcity.
27 Turton (1999) built on such concepts
and reasoned that this capacity has both supply
and demand aspects. He distinguishes first a
social component, “existing in the hearts and
minds of the governed,” which basically defines
the willingness and ability of the people to
accept the measures to be taken, as well as the
ability and legitimacy of the regime to generate
the needed strategies. The second component
can be engineered to some extent and consists
the capacity to mobilize and analyze data and
information, and to derive adequate strategies,
all of which—according to Turton—can possibly
be provided, either by local or foreign sources.
This division is useful in emphasizing some
supply and demand sides of the problem but,
while stressing the importance of quantitative
information and human resources, does not
fathom the societal term, which “is the difficult
one to come to terms with.”
28
Allan (1996) posits that the development of a
“diverse and strong” economy is a prerequisite to
the implementation of the measures needed to
manage the closure of water resources (with the
implication that in the opposite case, there is a
failure to manage it). Factors that are highly
correlated with economic development include,
for example, a certain degree of intellectual
capital to acquire and process data, and capital
availability and institutional capacity to devise
measures and to enforce them. Redressing
environmental degradation and improving water
quality also require both, very high outlays of
capital and the political capacity to enforce a
legal framework, where these funds are
effectively mobilized (from both public and
private sources).
29 In addition, there is a degree
of formalization of rights, of recourses available
to citizens to voice their opinions, and altogether
a more democratic participation of civil society,
all of which are also paramount in shaping the
decisions of politicians and policymakers.
However, it may be argued that developed
countries are also those in which pressure over
resources, water-quality problems and
environmental degradation has first occurred,
precisely because of their earlier economic
development. Therefore, their capacity to
manage basin closure could be seen as induced
by pressing needs and enabled by their financial
capacity, rather than as an intrinsic preexisting
quality. It might be hypothesized too, that
changes become easier to implement when
structural changes in the economy have reduced
the importance of agriculture and, therefore,
have reduced its political weight, and sometimes
the very amount of water it needs (in which
case, policy changes are facilitated by structural
changes). Finally, the very perception of
environmental damages, by people (and
consequently their motivation to act against
them), is highly linked to their standard of living
and is, therefore, weaker in developing countries.
In other words, it might well be that it is the
consequences of economic development that
(partly) facilitates basin-closure management,
rather than the factors that are believed to be
conducive to development.
27Ohlsson (1999), however, does not provide many clues on what makes societies endowed or deficient in “adaptive capacity.” Therefore,
stating that some societies adapt because they have enough “adaptive capacity” might be seen as tautological.
28This can be compared with Ruttan’s (1989) recognition that, if it is intuitively admitted that cultural factors exert major impact on behaviors
and responses to opportunities, the lack of analytical means to take this factor into consideration, is a “deficiency in professional capacity.”
29In the two decades following 1972, the USA has spent more than US$500 billion on preventing and cleaning up water pollution, so that
environmental costs have already exceeded the cost of subsidies in infrastructure (Frederick 1998). It is difficult to envision such a response
in developing countries.24
Supply and Demand Models: Much of the
theories of institutional changes, derived from the
works by Hayami and Ruttan (see for example
1985), as well as later New Institutional
Economics (NIE) approaches,
30 tend to favor the
demand side of change, with emphasis on
changes in relative resource endowments and
technical aspects. Individuals, seen as rational
entrepreneurs, respond to both “deadlock
situations” and opportunities. In the first case,
the design of new institutions is needed to adapt
to changing conditions, which have raised
transaction costs. In the second case, individuals
recognize the existence of uncaptured potential
gains and devise arrangements that allow them
to tap these gains. Regarding water resources,
the first case is well exemplified by rotational
arrangements in irrigated schemes, which need
to be implemented so as to deal with water
scarcity, or by basin-level management of water
quantities and quality. The second case can be
exemplified by negotiations for trans-basin
transfers or, more self-interest-centered, by the
capture of benefits by a given interest group
(such as sometimes would occur in processes of
privatization).
This last example shows that it would be
naive to assume that the constraints faced by a
society give way, through a perfect, market-like
mechanism, to a solution that minimizes
transaction costs and improves efficiency
(Wegerich 2001). It must be acknowledged that
the distribution of power, embodied in the access
to (water) resources, is a societal, historical
construction, where equity and efficiency might
not be the chief aspects. This takes us beyond
the economics of transaction costs, to include
political economy and rent-seeking behaviors
(Roumasset 1995).
30For North (1995), “the fundamental source of change is learning by entrepreneurs of organisations (sic)… and the rate of learning reflects
the intensity of competition amongst organisations (sic).”
This leads us to also give consideration to
top-down approaches of institutional change that
emphasize the supply of innovations by the elite
or by outsiders. This is not the place to expand
on theories of elite behavior and decision
making, but one may note, as emphasized by
North (1995), that “institutions are not
necessarily, or even usually created to be
socially efficient; rather they, or at least the
formal rules, are created to serve the interests of
those with the bargaining power to create new
rules.” This is also emphasized by Feeny (1988),
who sees the benefits and costs to the elite as a
main determinant of change. A policy implication
of this is that ignoring power structures is likely
to doom bottom-up movements or policies, to
failure (Wegerich 2001; Schlager and Blomquist
2000).
What triggers elite decision making is complex,
but it seems that immediate political consideration
generally overruns what some would like to see as
the result of rational planning (Schlager and
Blomquist 2000). In practice, changes are very
much demand-driven “by the need to find solutions
to relatively immediate, specific problems, not
grand visions of river basin or regional
development” (Whittington 1991; see also
Winpenny 1994). Historical changes in water
institutions, for example, have often been spurred
by flood or water-shortage crises (Livingston 1993;
Wengert 1985).
Disaggregating “Costs and Benefits”: Here we
may build on Wegerich’s (2001) conjecture that
both institutional change and adaptive capacity
are linked to the power of stakeholders, while
redefining power as the possession of resources,
information or legitimacy that allows actors to
select an option that best suits their interest.25
From this viewpoint, both decision-making and
the implementation of reforms, are seen as the
outcome of a process in which the financial,
economic, social (status) and political interests of
all actors are confronted. Actors typically include
states, other administrative units like
municipalities, politicians, line agencies,
construction companies or water utilities, banks
and development agencies, experts, lawyers,
environmentalists, lobbyists, NGO leaders and
activists, farmers
31 and other water users.
Part of the relative “weight” of these
categories of actors in the process of change (or
nonchange) is embodied in the institutions. They
partly define actors’ rights and, more generally,
how they are allowed or able to, voice their
concerns and have their opinions taken into
consideration, as well as to exercise their
agency. This also means that part of the change
is due to the responses to specific water scarcity
issues that individuals or small groups of people
are able to design locally. As seen earlier, such
responses include innovations in cropping
techniques, adjustments of farming activities,
improved individual and collective water
management, tapping local water resources and
also attempts to participate or intervene in more
macro-level issues, where the fate of their
access to water is mainly determined.
We may also retain the idea of “costs” as
determining societal responses, but “costs” must
encompass several dimensions: economic costs (in
infrastructure, of foregone benefits owing to water
deficits, etc.), transaction costs (in decision making,
conflict-solving, accessing information, etc.) or
political costs (unpopular measures). These costs
are paralleled by “benefits,” which accrue to
particular actors (increased water supply, more
companies, lawyers, politicians, etc.).
Last, this political economy of societal
response to water scarcity, is obviously shaped
by the physical/climatic context (aridity, humidity,
variability in precipitation, etc.), the available
technology (defined as “tools plus knowledge”
[Livingston 1993]), and the preexisting
sociocultural and institutional context. The
understanding of institutional change in the
management of water resources is a field of
investigation that clearly needs to be further
researched on (Ingram 1971; Livingston 1993).
31Listing categories does not mean that these are homogeneous: different farmers, for example, are in distinctly different positions, both in
physical terms (with regard to the water supply network) and in socioeconomic terms (see Schlager and Blomquist 2000).
Basin Trajectories
Acknowledging the variety of societal responses
to water scarcity and the complexity of
determining which particular response appears at
a certain point in time, a river-basin development
trajectory may be represented by the graph
shown in figure 7. The schematization retains the
general evolution towards basin closure,
although it is also recognized that a basin can
be “reopened” (see below). The succession of
circles (corresponding to that of figure 6)
represents successive adjustments to water
scarcity, which are made by the implementation
or the inducement of a range of individual,
collective and state responses that come under
three categories (supply expansion,
conservation, and allocation). (The varying26
respective shares of the inner circle (local) and
the outer circle (global), as well as the varying
sizes of the arrows, symbolize that the relative
importance of each response varies depending
on the point in time).
32
Which strategies have been implemented at
a given point in time, and similarly what options
are more suitable for the current situation, can
only be determined by a sound analysis of all
the relevant physical, economic and societal
factors. The preceding section provided
examples of issues situated at the convergence
or interface of several of these important factors.
Figure 8 proposes a variant of figure 7 and
introduces two visual modifications. The first one
represents a possible (albeit transient)
breakdown of the system, while the second,
indicates successive potential ceilings toward
“resource closure.” This accounts for the fact that
if total renewable basin resources can be
hydrologically defined, the share that is available
at one point in time, often depends on the
existing technological level. In other words,
societies are faced with different ceilings that
may shift with time, but that are sensed as
absolute ceilings for a certain period. Basins can
be reopened, and often are, by achieving a new
increment in supply through a costly investment
that was formerly thought not to be technically or
financially feasible. This, in particular, includes
trans-basin diversions, which are much more
common than is usually believed. Only 20
percent of the water used by south California, for
example, is generated locally, as the region is
mostly supplied by water from the Colorado
River (57%) and from the north of the state.
FIGURE 7.
Basin trajectories (1).
32The sizes and shares indicated here are arbitrary. This graph should be taken as a conceptual representation, rather than as a concrete
visualization of a particular change.27
The figure also reminds us that
unsustainable management may lead to using
resources beyond the potential threshold. This
means that aquifers may be “mined” (or depleted
faster than they are replenished), and reservoir
security stocks can be tapped during a few
FIGURE 8.
Basin trajectories (2)
consecutive seasons. It is not certain whether
unsustainable management will always be
tackled in an appropriate manner, since many
aquifers are probably doomed to be mined until
exhaustion (or, in practical terms, until
abstraction becomes economically unviable).28
Conclusions
Population growth and economic development
translate into growing pressure on water
resources. In the course of time, the
interdependence of users in the basin increases
and conflicts arise. Scarcity elicits adjustments in
water-supply augmentation, water-use efficiency
and in water allocation. Several existing
conceptual frameworks that provide a description
of basin development have been examined. The
great merit of these frameworks is that they offer
simplicity of reading that conveys the notion of
basin closure with great strength. They are
based on a sequence of phases that is widely
relevant to depict the evolutions observed during
the twentieth century in many basins or
countries. The downside of these approaches,
however, is that the simplification of reality does
not always allow one to fully capture or
understand the geographical and historical
diversity of river-basin development.
A first drawback resides in the representation
of the exploitation of water resources by a single
curve. A “disaggregated” diagram has been
proposed, that distinguishes between different
types of resources (rainwater, stream water, and
controlled [actual and potential] water), and that
allows a clearer view of the status of water use
in relation to supply, and specifies the part of the
supply that is controlled by man.
A second limitation in these frameworks
resides in their simplification of the succession of
different types of responses in sequence. These
responses often occur concomitantly or
sequentially, but not in the order proposed.
Adjustments in water-supply management,
allocation and institutions are made, not only by
the state, but also by individuals and groups, and
are characterized by their interrelatedness. Each
time a decision, taken either locally or at the
global level, impacts on water flow paths, in
terms of quantity, quality or timing, other users
are likely to be affected somewhere else in the
basin. The characteristics of each basin
command a particular pattern of evolution, which
may include gridlocks, collapses and the
diversion of water flows across basin boundaries.
Existing linear visions of basin development
tend to be based on economic rationality or on
concepts of social adaptiveness that are difficult
to evaluate. Societal responses to scarcity of
resources are driven not only by economic
considerations or locally perceived needs.
Rather, societal responses must also be
understood in a wider political economy
framework, in which costs and benefits are
attributed to different categories of actors who,
often, have antagonistic interests that are not
even internally homogeneous. The particular
blend of responses, selected by a society at a
particular point in time of its history, to address
water-resources problems must, therefore, be
understood within a framework that spans not
only hydrological, physical or economic
constraints, but also the distribution of agency
and power among actors, and their respective
interests and strategies.29
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